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Abstract: Institutional overlap emerges not only as an unintended by-product of
purposive state action but also as its deliberate result. In two ways, this article
expands existing research on the causes and consequences of institutional overlap.
First, we establish that three different types of dissatisfaction may lead states to
deliberately create institutional overlap: dissatisfaction with substantive norms and
rules, dissatisfaction with decision-making rules and dissatisfaction with the institu-
tional fit of an existing governance arrangement for a given cooperation problem.
Each type of dissatisfaction triggers a distinct motivation for the creation of institu-
tional overlap: to induce policy change, to increase influence on collective decision-
making or to enhance governance effectiveness. Second, we demonstrate that
whereas the motivation to induce policy change leads to interface conflicts, the
motivations to increase influence on collective decision-making and to enhance
governance effectiveness give rise to inter-institutional coordination. Three empirical
case studies on global energy governance, the governance of global development
banking and global environmental governance probe these analytical claims.
Keywords: coordination; fragmentation; global legal pluralism; institu-
tional overlap; regime complexes
I. Introduction
On 26 January 2009, a group of states created the International Renewable
Energy Agency (IRENA) because it was dissatisfied with the focus of the
International EnergyAgency (IEA) on fossil fuels as themain energy sources.
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The creation of IRENA was driven by the desire to circumvent political
opposition within the IEA and to shape new norms that promote renewable
energies (Van de Graaf 2013a). It led to interface conflicts between major
industrialised and industrialising countries.
Furthermore, on 16 January 2016, a group of states led by China
launched the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) because it was
dissatisfied with the reluctance of Western powers to redistribute influence
within theWorld Bank (WB) (Ikenberry and Lim 2017). The creation of the
AIIBwas driven byChina’s desire to increase its institutional power in global
development banking (Pratt 2017). It resulted in inter-institutional coordi-
nation with the WB.
Likewise, the creation of the Global Environment Facility (GEF) on the
eve of the 1992 Rio Earth Summit induced inter-institutional coordination.
TheGEFwas established on 28October 1991 by states thatwere dissatisfied
with the ability of both the United Nations (UN) and theWB to organise the
funding of environmental projects in developing countries and countries
with economies in transition. These states were motivated to boost the
effectiveness of global environmental governance by creating an institu-
tional framework that enables the redistribution of financial resources.
These three cases exemplify a larger, and growing, trend in global gover-
nance: the propensity of states to deliberately create institutional overlap
(Alter and Raustiala 2018; Benvenisti and Downs 2007; Zürn and Faude
2013). Institutional overlap implies that separately established international
institutions do not operate in isolation from each other, but influence each
other’s normative development and governance effectiveness (Dunoff 2012;
Wiener et al. 2012). Thus, it reflects and facilitates change in the interna-
tional legal order (Lang et al. 2013).
The Introduction to this Special Issue identifies the causes and conse-
quences of institutional overlap as one of the three dominant questions that
animate the literature on regime complexity and international legal multi-
plicity (cf. Hofmann 2011; Zelli and van Asselt 2013). Existing research
suggests that deliberately created institutional overlap virtually always leads
to conflicts between groups of actors that support diverging norms and rules
(Benvenisti and Downs 2007; Morse and Keohane 2014). Thus, it cannot
account for the emergence of inter-institutional coordination in two of the
three cases introduced above. This shortcoming is due to the fact that
existing research does not delve into the different motivations of actors to
create institutional overlap (de Búrca 2016).
Against this backdrop, the present article develops three causal mecha-
nisms that enable explaining why the creation of IRENA induced interface
conflicts whereas the creation of the AIIB and the GEF resulted in inter-
institutional coordination. More precisely, it makes two contributions.
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First, we establish that deliberately created institutional overlap can be
caused by dissatisfaction with the substantive norms and/or rules of existing
institutions, dissatisfaction with their decision-making rules or dissatisfac-
tion with the institutional fit of an existing governance arrangement (which
may consist of one or more than one international institution) for a given
cooperation problem.1 Each of these three types of dissatisfaction with the
institutional status quo triggers a distinct motivation to purposively create
institutional overlap, namely to induce policy change, to increase influence
on collective decision-making or to enhance governance effectiveness.2
Second, we elucidate why only dissatisfaction with substantive norms and
rules leads to interface conflicts, whereas dissatisfaction with decision-
making rules and institutional fit results in inter-institutional coordination.
In short, the article argues that the consequences of deliberately created
institutional overlap depend on its causes.
We therefore address interface conflicts as possible analytical end points
of causal pathways that are triggered by specific types of dissatisfaction with
the institutional status quo on the part of a group of states (cf. Kreuder-
Sonnen and Zürn, this issue). In so doing, we tackle one of the pivotal
questions that motivate this Special Issue: Under which conditions does
institutional overlap lead to interface conflicts and when does it induce
inter-institutional coordination? More precisely, we enhance our under-
standing of ‘when, why, and how overlaps […] are seen, used, and abused
by the actors of world politics’ (Kreuder-Sonnen and Zürn, this issue).
In sum, we push forward research on international legal multiplicity by
demonstrating how coherence among separately established international
1 Institutional fit denotes thebasic ability of an existing governance arrangement to achieve its
designated governance objective (Young 2002). By implication, actors that are dissatisfied with
institutional fit need not be able to assess the effectiveness of a certain governance arrangement in
a fine-grained way. They only need to be able to assess whether an existing governance arrange-
ment is basically able to effectively address a certain cooperation problem. States also need not be
in full agreement as to how a given cooperation problem should be addressed. They only need to
agree that a given cooperation problem is in need of an institutional response that is not yet (fully)
provided.
2 Our analytical categories are sufficiently broad and our theoretical logics sufficiently
general to accommodate a wide variety of empirical cases. If, for example, a group creates a
new institution to exert leadership or to reframe a problem, it does so because it seeks to induce
policy change, increase influence on collective decision-making or enhance governance effective-
ness. Moreover, every motivation imaginable presupposes some type of dissatisfaction with the
institutional status quo. If, for example, states were perfectly satisfied with the existing gover-
nance arrangement, theywould not be ready to accept the costs that comewith exerting leadership
or reframing a problem. And if a group of states is motivated by legitimacy concerns with or
distributional effects of the existing governance arrangement, that motivation equally presup-
poses dissatisfaction with the substantive norms and rules, the decision-making rules or the
institutional fit of an existing governance arrangement.
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legal orders is possible in the absence of constitutionalised structures
(cf. Dunoff and Trachtman 2009; Krisch 2010). More precisely, we eluci-
date how the flexible adaptation that global legal pluralists highlight as a
virtue of decentralised governance systems gives rise to coherent governance
even if institutional overlap is deliberately created (Krisch et al., this issue).
By implication, we call into doubt that the coexistence of partially over-
lapping normative orders is inherently destabilising the international legal
system, as some global constitutionalists suggest (Dunoff and Trachtman
2009; Wiener et al. 2012).
The article is structured as follows: First, we introduce our central con-
cepts. Second, we develop three causal mechanisms to account for the
emergence of interface conflicts and inter-institutional coordination. Third,
we demonstrate how interface conflicts have emerged between the propo-
nents of the IEA and those of IRENA, and how inter-institutional coordi-
nation was realised between the WB and the AIIB, and between the GEF,
other international environmental institutions and the WB.
II. Introducing our central concepts: Institutional overlap, interface
conflicts, inter-institutional coordination
We speak of institutional overlap if the mandates of two or more separately
established international institutions intersect on a de facto basis (Hofmann
2011). In areas of institutional overlap, two or more international institu-
tions seek to govern the behaviour of actors by prescribing behavioural
roles, constraining activity and shaping expectations (Keohane 1988: 383).
More often than not, the governance efforts of overlapping international
institutions diverge from each other. As a result, behavioural roles are not
prescribed unequivocally, activities are not constrained clearly and expec-
tations are not shaped definitively. Rather, institutional overlap gives rise to
competing authority claims and, thus, to contestations among multiple
centres of international authority in the absence of a formal hierarchy
(Alter andRaustiala 2018: 9). Thus, institutional overlap iswidely perceived
to have a destabilising effect on global governance (ILC 2006).
In our three cases, actors have deliberately created institutional overlap.
As the Introduction to this Special Issue explains, such overlap is particularly
prone to give rise to interface conflicts, defined as positional differences
between actors over the prevalence of norms and/or rules enshrined in
separately established but functionally overlapping international institutions
(Kreuder-Sonnen and Zürn, this issue). Put differently, interface conflicts
imply that actors hold conflicting positions on the scope and applicability
of norms and/or rules enshrined in overlapping international institutions.
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They are created and become observable through contestations by actors
in practices or speech acts (cf. Kreuder-Sonnen and Zürn, this issue).
However, institutional overlap may also give rise to inter-institutional
coordination (Gehring and Faude 2013).We define inter-institutional coor-
dination as the alignment of the governance activities of overlapping insti-
tutions in ways that give rise to coherent governance. Coordination is
instantiated byprocedural norms that effectively govern the relations among
overlapping international institutions in ways that produce coherent gover-
nance (Gehring and Faude 2014; Krisch 2010: Ch 7).
Inter-institutional coordination presupposes the agreement of relevant
actors. It therefore implies the absence or resolution of interface conflicts
and competing claims to authority. That is, if inter-institutional coordina-
tion is realised, actors do not voice conflicting positions on the scope
and applicability of norms and/or rules enshrined in overlapping interna-
tional institutions. Rather, they recognise the distinct contributions all over-
lapping institutions make to global governance. Reaching inter-institutional
coordination can be a highly political process, especially if it connects
international institutions from different issue-areas, for example interna-
tional trade institutions and international environmental institutions. Since
international institutions from different issue-areas embody diverging soci-
etal rationalities, coordinating them is inherently political in nature
(Koskenniemi 2012). International institutions from only one issue-area,
by contrast, express the same societal rationality, e.g. promoting interna-
tional trade or protecting the climate. Coordinating them is therefore less of
a political and more of a technical exercise (Dunoff 2012).
III. Connecting the causes and consequences of institutional overlap:
Three causal mechanisms
To explain why the creation of IRENA led to interface conflicts, whereas the
creation of the AIIB and theGEF resulted in inter-institutional coordination,
we develop three causal mechanisms. A causal mechanism is an analytical
construct which enables the development of ‘causal generalizations about
recurring processes’ (Mayntz 2009). It consists of a set of logically connected
statements that specifies a distinct causal chain. Thus, causal mechanisms
provide plausible accounts of how a given cause is connected to an observed
effect (Schelling 1998).
Each of the three mechanisms developed below connects a specific type of
dissatisfaction with a given institutional status quo to a specific motivation
for the creation of institutional overlap and that motivation to a specific
outcome. The object of dissatisfaction varies across the three mechanisms.
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Actors may be dissatisfied with substantive norms and rules, with decision-
making rules or with the institutional fit of an existing governance arrange-
ment to its social environment.3
Substantive norms and rules seek to govern the behaviour of state- and
non-state actors. Decision-making rules, by contrast, govern how collec-
tively binding decisions are made within international institutions. And
institutional fit denotes the basic ability of an existing governance arrange-
ment to achieve its designated governance objective such as international
financial stability or the protection of human rights (cf. Young 2002).4
The motivations of states to create institutional overlap vary accordingly:
if dissatisfied with substantive norms and/or rules, states become motivated
to change the norms and/or rules that govern the behaviour of actors and,
thus, the direction in which a given issue-area is governed (Helfer 2009); if
dissatisfied with decision-making rules, they seek to increase influence on
collective decision-making (Pratt 2017); if dissatisfied with institutional fit,
they gain the motivation to increase governance effectiveness (Dunoff 2012;
Young 2002). These different motivations, in turn, yield varying conse-
quences for global governance.
Our causal mechanisms presuppose that states establish international
institutions to realise their common interests and design them in ways that
enable the realisation of joint gains (Koremenos et al. 2001). At the same
time, we assume that every state cares about the distribution of cooperation
gains and seeks to capture as many cooperation gains as possible (Krasner
1991).Moreover, it is conceivable that the interests of states evolve over time
in reaction to exogenous change. Depending on the type of cooperation
problem to be solved, this logic of action leads states to include institutional
agents, such as secretariats or court-like bodies, in the institutional design.
We expect such agents to act in accordance with states’ preferences and the
mandate of the institution.
How dissatisfaction with substantive rules leads to interface conflicts
Dissatisfied states have several options for seeking policy change with an
existing international institution: they can voice dissent, threaten to cease
implementing substantive norms or actually stop implementing them. If
none of these actions yields change in substantive norms, there is still the
option to create an overlapping institution.
3 Dissatisfaction with institutional fit is particularly likely to arise as a result of exogenous
change.
4 For Young, institutional fit denotes the ‘(mis)match between properties of biogeophysical
systems and attributes of institutions’ (Young 2002: xiv). For us, institutional fit denotes the (mis)
match between the institutional design of a governance arrangement and its social environment.
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We posit that interface conflicts between defenders and challengers of
the institutional status quo are likely to emerge if institutional overlap is
created to induce international policy change. If states that are dissatisfied
with substantive norms resort to inter-institutional means to induce
policy change, those that are satisfied with the institutional status quo
were by implication successful in defending it. Thus, challengers and
defenders inevitably hold positional differences on the prevalence of
overlapping norms.
In order to identify this causal mechanism empirically, we need to observe
a) utterances of states which indicate that they are dissatisfied with the
substantive norms and/or rules of a given international institution, b) actions
of those states that result in institutional overlap, c) justifications of those
actions with the intention to change the prevalent substantive norms and/or
rules, and d) conflicting positions between the defenders of the incumbent
institution(s) and its challengers on the scope and applicability of norms
and/or rules enshrined in the overlapping institutions. The mechanism is
disconfirmed if dissatisfaction with substantive norms and/or rules leads to
institutional overlap, but coordination is observable among the overlapping
institutions instead of interface conflicts among its proponents.
How dissatisfaction with decision-making rules leads to inter-
institutional coordination
If a group of states is dissatisfied with its influence on collective decision-
making within an international institution, it may seek change in decision-
making rules. For various reasons, however, such an effort may fail. Most
importantly, redistributing influence within an existing institution is a zero-
sum game which is notoriously difficult to solve. Thus, states seeking to
increase influence on collective decision-making are incentivised to create
institutional overlap (Pratt 2017).
We posit that interface conflicts are unlikely to emerge if institutional
overlap is created to increase influence on collective decision-making. Since
defenders and challengers of the institutional status quo do not hold
diverging positions with regard to substantive norms or rules, we expect
the substantive norms institutionalised in the newly created institution to
resemble those prevalent in the incumbent institution(s). By implication,
the potential for interface conflicts is low. The emergence of inter-
institutional coordination, by contrast, is more likely. It may be established
if both groups share an interest in reaping the additional cooperation gains
that can be generated by inter-institutional coordination compared to a
situation of behavioural uncertainty created by competing claims to
authority.
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In order to identify this causal mechanism empirically, we need to observe
a) utterances of states which indicate their dissatisfaction with the decision-
making rules of a given governance arrangement, b) actions of those states
that result in institutional overlap, c) justifications of those actions with the
intention to increase influence on collective decision-making, and d) the
emergence of inter-institutional coordination which is visible in formal or
informal institutional arrangements and in utterances of actors indicating
their recognition of the distinct scopes of authority of all overlapping
institutions. The mechanism is disconfirmed if dissatisfaction with
decision-making rules leads to institutional overlap, but interface conflicts
between the proponents of the overlapping institutions are observable
instead of inter-institutional coordination.
How dissatisfaction with institutional fit leads to inter-institutional
coordination
If a group of states is dissatisfied with the institutional fit of an existing
governance arrangement, that is, if certain states are dissatisfied with its
basic ability to solve the underlying cooperation problem, they may become
motivated to create a new institution in order to enhance governance
effectiveness (cf. Zelli and van Asselt 2013: 8). Most importantly, institu-
tional fit is deficient if not all governance functions that are required to
effectively address a given cooperation problem are provided by the existing
institution(s). If this is the case, deficient institutional fit results from a
‘governance gap’ (Clarke 2019). It may be closed by expanding themandate
of an already existing institution. However, because any international
institution includes a plethora of veto players, this is a cumbersome process
whichmay easily fail. Actorsmay therefore decide to create a new institution
that supplies the required governance function.5
Enhancing governance effectiveness through increasing institutional fit
requires synergistic co-governance. Thus, when states create a new institu-
tion in order to close a ‘governance gap’, they will carefully design that
institution in a way that it complements those already existing (cf. Young
2002). By implication, actors will strive to avoid interface conflicts (Dunoff
2012).
In order to identify this causalmechanism empirically, we need to observe
a) utterances of states which indicate their dissatisfaction with the institu-
tional fit of an existing governance arrangement, b) actions of those states
that result in institutional overlap, c) justifications of those actions with
the intention to increase governance effectiveness, and d) the emergence
5 This causal mechanism therefore does not apply to ‘regime-shifting’ (Helfer 2009).
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of inter-institutional coordination (see above). This mechanism is discon-
firmed if dissatisfaction with institutional fit leads to institutional overlap,
but interface conflicts between different groups of actors are observable
instead of inter-institutional coordination.
For analytical purposes, each of our causal mechanisms isolates one type
of dissatisfaction with the institutional status quo as a trigger for the
deliberate creation of institutional overlap. Empirically, it is nonetheless
possible that states havemore than one reason to be dissatisfied with a given
institutional status quo. We posit, however, that if this is the case, it will
nevertheless be possible to identify one dominant type of dissatisfaction. If
so, the motivations of states that deliberately create institutional overlap
converge around their specific types of dissatisfaction with the institutional
status quo. This does, however, not imply that their preferences are
completely homogenous. Rather, additional motivations (beyond those
triggered by the specific type of dissatisfaction) are likely to diverge among
those states.
IV. Coordination or conflict? Evidence from three empirical cases
In the remainder of this article, we subject our causal mechanisms to
plausibility probes across different issue-areas (Eckstein 1975). As an
intermediate step between hypothesis generation and hypothesis testing,
plausibility probes serve an important function in theory development
(Levy 2008: 7).
Our universe of cases consists of all instances in which institutional
overlap is deliberately created by establishing a new international institu-
tion. Out of this universe we select three cases for empirical investigation
that vary on our central explanatory variable: type of dissatisfaction with
the institutional status quo. That is, each of our three cases features one
specific type of dissatisfaction: dissatisfaction with substantive norms
and/or rules (IEA/IRENA case), dissatisfaction with decision-making rules
(WB/AIIB case) and dissatisfaction with institutional fit (GEF case). This
case selection technique enables us to investigate whether our theoretical
propositions on how the consequences of deliberately created institutional
overlap are related to its causes are borne out empirically (cf. King et al.
1994: 137–41).
Institutional overlap between IEA and IRENA
IRENA was created because a group of states was dissatisfied with the
substantive focus of the IEA on fossil fuels as the main energy sources and
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the corresponding norms it promoted.6 IRENA's creation was driven by the
desire to shape new substantive norms that promote renewable energies in
order to ‘offset the IEA’s perceived bias in favor of the fossil fuel and nuclear
industries’ (Van deGraaf and Lesage 2009: 301). Its creation led to interface
conflicts between the supporters of both institutions.
Dissatisfaction with the substantive norms promoted by the IEA. The
primary governance objective of the IEA is to ‘promote secure oil supplies
on reasonable and equitable terms’ (IEP Agreement 1974: 5). Despite the
broadening of IEA’s scope by the adoption of the Shared Goals (energy
security, economic development and environmental protection) (IEA 1993),
a group of states led byGermany perceived that its work continued to favour
fossil fuels and nuclear energies. The IEA was accused of institutional
blindness, inter alia because it upheld implementation agreements advanc-
ing research on nuclear energies instead of accommodating states’ growing
demands for renewable energies (Adam 2009). Hermann Scheer, a leading
figure in the creation of IRENA, vividly articulated this position by claiming
that the IEA ‘leaves no stone unturned when it comes to emphasizing the
long-term indispensability of nuclear and fossil energy’ (Scheer 2007: 174).
As concerns over climate change grew, this group of states increasingly saw
renewable energies as viable alternatives to the conventional energy sources
still promoted by the IEA. However, the IEA proved to be ‘structurally
frozen in time’ (Colgan et al. 2012: 126). Its analyses continued to under-
estimate ‘the potential of renewable sources of energy’ (Van deGraaf 2013a:
26) and to promote oil, coal and nuclear energy as ‘irreplaceable’ energy
sources (Van de Graaf and Lesage 2009: 309). In 2009, it spent only 2 per
cent of its total budget on renewables.7 As a result, the IEA was accused of
obstructing a global shift to renewable energies (Van de Graaf 2013b: 96).
Policy-motivated institutional creation of IRENA. Seeing major changes in
IEA policies to accommodate renewable energies as highly unlikely, the
dissatisfied states created a new institution: IRENA. Its purpose is to ‘pro-
mote the widespread and increased adoption and the sustainable use of all
forms of renewable energy’ (Article II IRENA Statute). To that end, IRENA
provides policy advice, gathers and disseminates information, and engages
6 The IEA lacks ‘directive influence over the energy policy decisions of its member countries’
(Heubaum and Biermann 2015: 236). It does, however, advocate certain courses of action by
gathering and interpreting information, by providing recommendations and advice for its mem-
bers and by facilitating technology transfer. In doing so, it spreads substantive norms.
7 <https://www.renewableenergyworld.com/articles/2009/06/interview-hans-jrgen-koch-
explains-why-irena-is-50-times-more-than-the-iea.html>.
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in capacity building, the promotion of technology transfer and the stimula-
tion of research (Colgan et al. 2012: 129).
IRENA ‘was promoted explicitly as a counterweight to, and remedy for
the failings of, the [IEA]’ (Overland and Reischl 2018: 337). That is, it was
created to ‘counter the IEA’s alleged supportive stance toward the fossil and
nuclear energy industries’ (Van de Graaf 2013b: 108). Hans Jørgen Koch, a
member of the Danish parliament’s energy and climate committee, asserts
‘For ten years the IEA has underestimated the competitiveness of renewable
energy sources (…) so there is a clear need for IRENA’ (Young 2009: 2).
Thus, the motivation to create IRENA was to incite policy change by
redirecting the focus of global energy governance from fossil fuels to renew-
able energies. It therefore comes as no surprise that prominent members of
the IEA (the United States (US), France, Great Britain, Canada, Japan,
Australia and Italy) were opposed to IRENA (Van de Graaf 2013b: Ch 5).
The effects of policy-motivated institutional overlap: Interface conflict on
energy security andmitigating climate change. The promotion of renewable
energies through IRENA directly challenges the IEA’s substantive focus on
fossil fuel and nuclear based energy systems. Moreover, the IEA’s core
principles of centralised energy security directed at industrialised states
starkly contrast with IRENA’s principles of voluntariness and decentralised
renewable energy provision directed at industrialising states (Dubash and
Florini 2011).
A central issue in which states perceive great difficulty to reconcile the
objectives of IEA and IRENA is the provision of global energy security and
the mitigation of climate change. In a highly fragmented global energy
system, energy supply security and environmental sustainability cannot be
attained to the same degree simultaneously. Thus, positional differences on
how to balance these two governance objectives emerged between major
industrialised and industrialising states (Dubash and Florini 2011).
A variety of speech acts by the proponents of the IEA and those of IRENA
shows that an interface conflict exists with regard to the prevalence of
substantive global energy supply norms promoted by both institutions.
Major industrialised states continue to recognise the IEA as an authority in
the field of global energy security. For example, the US and Australia
openly advocate for ensuring energy security through the use of coal
resources. They further argue that coal resources ‘offer opportunity for
developing nations to access tomorrow’s coal technology to improve
energy security’ (Watts 2018). In 2015, Australian energy minister Josh
Frydenberg presented a ‘moral case’ in which he portrays the IEA as an
authority to strengthen Australia’s position that coal is a reliable future
energy source. Frydenberg claims that ‘[t]here’s a clear increase in demand
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for coal and indeed energy across the world […] and the International
Energy Agency says 75%of [energy] demand [in 2040] will be met by fossil
fuels’ (Milman 2015).
In contrast, major industrialising states, especially China, perceive the
IEA to continually favour coal power plants despite their undeniable
contribution to anthropogenic climate change. Thus, they support the
substantive norms promoted by IRENA. For example, China utilises
IRENA’s principle to support economic development and contends that
industrialising states ‘should be afforded some leniency in emissions as they
are currently in critical stages of economic development’ (Council on
Foreign Relations 2013).
Given that major industrialised and industrialising states have incompat-
ible positions on energy security and the mitigation of climate change, they
cannot reach an agreement on the scope and applicability of the substantive
norms promoted by IEA and IRENA. Hence, the interface conflict persists.
As the Introduction to this Special Issue suggests, there is, however, the
possibility that it incites coordination in the long run. The ‘greening’ of the
IEAand its efforts to establish a partnershipwith IRENA indicate that actors
within both institutions are interested in developing a coordinated response
(Heubaum and Biermann 2015). However, these efforts have hitherto not
resolved the persistent positional differences between major industrialised
and industrialising countries. Irrespective of whether this will happen in the
future, key for our article is that an interface conflict emerged at all in
this case.
Institutional overlap between the AIIB and the World Bank
Rising powers create institutional overlap because established powers are
hesitant to redistribute influence within existing international institutions in
ways that acknowledge their increased power resources (Ikenberry and Lim
2017). China’s creation of the AIIB is a case in point. Since the US did not
agree to expand China’s institutional power within the WB in accordance
with its overall economic power, China launched the AIIB (Pratt 2017).
China’s dissatisfaction with the decision-making rules of the World Bank.
Starting in 2010, China vehemently voiced discontent that its increase in
economic power and in its financial contribution to theWB did not translate
into greaterWB vote shares.8 Chinese FinanceMinister Xie Xuren demands
that ‘[t]he future shareholding principles should continue to be based on
8 <http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/china/overview>.
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economic weight, […] and aim to achieve the ultimate goal of equitable
voting power between developing countries and developed countries’
(Xinhua 2010).
At several occasions, the sense of unfairness with existing decision-
making procedures was articulated publicly: At the WB and the Interna-
tional Monetary Fund’s (IMF) Annual Meeting in Lima in 2015, Chinese
Finance Minister Jiwei Lou urged the WB ‘to continuously push forward
governance reform and notably increase the voice and representation of
developing countries […] based on the changing global economic weight, so
that the developing world can play a greater role in the Bank’s decision
making process’ (Lou 2015). Moreover, at the World Economic Forum
2017, Chinese President Xi Jinping said that ‘[e]merging markets and
developing countries deserve greater representation and voice’ in the
US-dominated development banks (Jinping 2017).
However, China’s efforts to redistribute influence in the WB were unsuc-
cessful. To be sure, theWB underwent a ‘voice reform’ to increase the voting
powers of developing states in 2016, but minuscule changes in the WB’s
decision-making rules were not even close to satisfying China’s longing for
more equitable vote distribution (Vestergaard and Wade 2015: 6).
The power-based motivation to create the AIIB. Because of the persistence
of its low influence on collective decision-making within the WB, China
launched the AIIB. To be sure, China also criticised the WB for its failure to
provide financial assistance when the global economy was in crisis. More-
over, it justifies the creation of the AIIB with regard to strengthening the
global economy and its capacities for regional infrastructure development.
However, its main motivation for creating the AIIB was to increase its
influence on collective decision-making (Hashmi 2015). China possesses
26.64 per cent of the vote shares in the AIIB, which contrasts with the 4.45
per cent of the vote shares it holds in the WB.9
Inter-institutional coordination between the AIIB and the WB. Although
the US initially sought to limit the AIIBmembership, this initial strife did not
lead to an interface conflict between the US and China. Rather, the creation
of the AIIB led to inter-institutional coordination developed and recognised
by the proponents of both institutions.
Inter-institutional coordination manifests itself in different ways. First,
the AIIB mandate closely resembles the structure and content of the WB
mandate. This is unsurprising because the AIIB used the WB mandate as a
9 <https://www.aiib.org/en/about-aiib/governance/members-of-bank/index.html>.
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template for its own regulatory framework (Lichtenstein 2018).10 As a
result, the substantive norms and rules enshrined in the two development
banks do not differ. The occurrence of an interface conflict is therefore
unlikely to begin with.
Second, and relatedly, the governance objectives of the WB and the AIIB
closely align. In essence, the AIIB joins WB efforts to ‘foster economic
growth in the developing world’ (Liao 2015). Instead of handling this
overlap as a rivalry, China repeatedly encourages cooperation among the
banks and reaffirms that the AIIB poses no threat to any other development
bank. In Chinese Foreign Minister Hong Lei’s words, the ‘AIIB will com-
plement existing multilateral development banks’ (Xinhua 2015). To date,
two-thirds of all AIIB projects are co-financed (Gutner 2018).
China’s continued recognition of the WB as an authority in development
banking is further reciprocated by the US. In 2015 US President Barack
Obama backtracked on earlier US hostilities toward the AIIB by saying ‘let
me be very clear and dispel this notion that we were opposed or are opposed
to other countries participating in the [AIIB.…We] look forward to collab-
orating with the [AIIB], just like we do with the [Asian Development Bank]
and with the [WB]’ (Obama 2015).
Third, inter-institutional coordination between the AIIB and the WB is
institutionalised in Memoranda of Understanding. More precisely, the
AIIB and the WB have developed collaborative arrangements to be able
to co-finance projects efficiently. Alone in 2016, the same year that theAIIB
became operational, collaborative arrangements supported five
co-financed projects in Pakistan, Azerbaijan and Indonesia (World Bank
2017). Within these arrangements, the AIIB and WB agreed on joint
supervision during project implementation with the WB being the lead
supervisor (e.g. AIIB 2016). The AIIB, for its part, regards the WB loan
conditions as ‘satisfactory’ (AIIB 2017) and even ‘rel[ies] on the WB’s
determination of compliance with the […] WB policies and procedures’
(AIIB 2016: 5). Thus, both development banks effectively ensure environ-
mental and social standards as part of project implementations. In sum, the
deliberate creation of institutional overlap resulted in inter-institutional
coordination between the AIIB and the WB.
Institutional overlap between the UNFCCC, the WB and the GEF
The GEF was created to enable financial transfers from developed to
developing countries and countries with economies in transition. These
10 The AIIB mandate was established under the guidance of Natalie Lichtenstein, a former
senior official at the WB. China’s decision to bestow the role of Chief Counsel in the AIIB’s
founding process upon her signifies a strategic move by China to avoid interface conflicts.
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transfers were supposed to provide the latter countries with the resources
needed to meet the commitments they enter(ed) into under various (existing
and newly emerging) international environmental agreements. More pre-
cisely, the GEF was created to play a functional role in supporting environ-
mental projects conducted under the umbrella of the UN Framework
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), the UN Development Pro-
gramme (UNDP), the UN Environmental Programme (UNEP) and the
World Bank. To that effect, it was designed to complement the governance
activities of existing (and newly emerging) institutions.
The dissatisfaction of industrialised states with institutional fit. At the
World Bank–IMF Meeting in 1989, France questioned the WB’s ability
to finance global environmental projects and proposed the creation of a
global environment fund. On behalf of theMember States of the European
Communities, Pierre Bérégovoy, French Minister of Economy and
Finance, proclaimed that ‘[e]ach country must mobilise its own resources,
but France believes that the World Bank must also be provided with
specific additional resources so that it can encourage large-scale programs’
(Bérégovoy 1989: 79).
The demand of major industrialised states for additional resources to
finance environmental projects arose from their dissatisfaction with the
insufficient ability of existing institutions to redistribute financial resources
from developed to developing countries in order to effectively protect the
environment. In other words, those states considered existing institutions
unable to fulfil a governance function that is indispensable for effective
global environmental governance.
In his address to Congress in 1992, US President George H. W. Bush
envisioned that the GEF would ‘become the principal vehicle for assisting
developing nations with the incremental costs of gaining global environ-
mental benefits under new international agreements’ (Bush 1992). President
Bush succinctly summarises the position that theWBandUNenvironmental
as well as developmental capacities do not suffice to find appropriate
solutions to environmental problems. Thus, the creation of a new institution
was considered necessary to effectively protect the environment by redis-
tributing financial resources from developed to developing countries (ODI
1993).
Effectiveness-motivated overlap to establish a mechanism for financing
global environmental projects. The then WB President Barber Conable
explicitly pointed to the potential of a separate fund for financing environ-
mental projects to enhance governance effectiveness: ‘It appears that there is
broad agreement on the notion of providing additional concessional
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resources to support environmental actions with global implications, where
the current funding arrangements do not provide borrowing countries with
sufficient incentive to do so’ (Conable 1990, emphasis added).
The GEF was first launched in November 1990 as a three-year pilot
project. Over time, it ‘emerged as the major international mechanism for
funding global environmental efforts’ (ODI 1993: 3). Among other things, it
invests in projects that target the reduction of carbon emissions, sustainable
landscapes and seascapes, water resource management, safe disposal of
hazardous chemicals and protected areas.
Inter-institutional coordination between GEF, other international environ-
mental institutions and the WB. The GEF was from the outset designed to
complement the governance activities of other international institutions.
The WB resolution for creating the GEF entails a tripartite agreement
stipulating that UNEP heads the strategic planning of the GEF to ensure
that its operations are in alignment with the objectives of international
environmental agreements. UNDP organises studies and assessments to
support GEF operations, and the WB administers the GEF’s core Trust-
Fund and manages the project cycle for global environmental investments
(World Bank 1991).
Inter-institutional coordination is further strengthened through a Mem-
orandum of Understanding which was established between the UNFCCC
and the WB. As a result, the UNFCCC Executive Secretaries repeatedly
praised their ‘strong collaboration’ (Figueres 2011) and reassured the ‘full
commitment of the Climate Change secretariat to build stronger collabo-
ration with the GEF as part of our joint pursuit of supporting Parties in
achieving the objective of theConvention’ (de Boer 2010, emphasis added).
Moreover, the GEF financing of the CC:TRAIN project to educate and
assist civil servants in implementing UNFCCC objectives, as well as GEF
financing of UNFCCC-related country studies on its climate objectives
and inventories of emitted greenhouse gases such as in the Maldives
and Tunisia contribute to inter-institutional coordination (Young and
Boehmer-Christiansen 1998).
Major industrialised countries such as Australia and Canada recognise
the authority of the GEF in global environmental governance. In its Multi-
lateral Assessment report, Australia recognises GEF’s strong complemen-
tarity to the existent governance system as ‘GEF effectively coordinates the
international response to these conventions and, thereby, plays an impor-
tant role’ (Australian Government 2012: 5). Australia perceives that GEF
values not only align with environmental structures, but also with partner
country priorities (Australian Government 2012: 11). In a similar manner,
Canada notes the GEF’s careful adaptation to the existing multilateral
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system: ‘By supporting the GEF, Canada helps developing countries imple-
ment their multilateral environmental agreements’ (Government of Canada
2019). Interface conflicts, by contrast, are not observable.
Since the GEF gets a mandate from other international institutions, one
may argue that the emergence of interface conflicts is prevented by institu-
tional design. Its inherent plausibility notwithstanding, such an objection
sits uneasily with the conventional wisdom that deliberately created insti-
tutional overlap is particularly conflict-ridden. The broader contribution of
this case study is therefore to exemplify that an exclusive analytical focus on
norm collisions and interface conflicts risks overlooking other phenomena
that are equally relevant for understanding international legal multiplicity
(Dunoff 2012).
V. Conclusion
Existing research suggests that deliberately created institutional overlap
virtually always leads to conflicts between groups of actors that support
diverging norms and rules (Benvenisti and Downs 2007; Morse and
Keohane 2014). We, in contrast, demonstrate that this particular type of
overlap can also lead to inter-institutional coordination. More precisely, we
demonstrate that the consequences of deliberately created institutional over-
lap depend on why exactly states are dissatisfied with the institutional status
quo. Interface conflicts emerge only if states are dissatisfied with the substan-
tive norms and/or rules of an existing institutional arrangement and, thus,
seek to induce policy change. In contrast, if states are dissatisfied with
decision-making rules, the creation of institutional overlap gives rise to
inter-institutional coordination. Likewise, if states are dissatisfied with the
institutional fit of an existing governance arrangement and seek to enhance
governance effectiveness, institutional overlap results in inter-institutional
coordination. These findings suggest that interface conflicts are less wide-
spread than commonly expected (cf. Kreuder-Sonnen and Zürn, this issue).
Each of our three empirical cases represents a much larger universe of
cases which revolves around a specific type of dissatisfaction with the
institutional status quo. The universe revolving around dissatisfaction with
substantive norms and/or rules accommodates, among others, the attempt
of developed countries to induce policy change in the international protec-
tion of intellectual property rights by adopting theWTOTRIPS Agreement,
the creation of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and the creation of
the Proliferation Security Initiative. In all three cases, interface conflicts
emerged between the proponents of the newly created institutions and those
defending the incumbent ones, namely the World Intellectual Property
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Organization, the UNand theOrganization for Security andCooperation in
Europe, and the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea.
The universe of cases revolving around dissatisfaction with decision-
making rules is particularly relevant against the backdrop of the current
shift in the global power distribution. It includes various instances of overlap
between the time-tested institutions created by established powers and other
institutions recently established by rising powers, for example the New
Development Bank. As long as rising powers are primarily dissatisfied with
the decision-making rules of incumbent institutions, the occurrence of
interface conflicts between rising and established powers is unlikely.
Finally, the universe of cases revolving around dissatisfaction with
institutional fit includes, for example, the creation of the Financial Sta-
bility Forumwhich the G-7 states created in response to the 2008 financial
crisis in order to rectify the deficiencies of the existing institutions (Clarke
2014). In sum, it is safe to say that our three empirical cases belong to
larger populations which can be analysed by the causal mechanisms
developed in this article.
Our findings support previous research on global legal pluralism which
points to the potential of international legal multiplicity to give rise to coherent
and flexible global governance (Krisch 2010). By implication, they call into
doubt the position of those global constitutionalists who argue that the coex-
istence of partially overlapping normative orders is inherently destabilising the
international legal system (Dunoff and Trachtman 2009; Wiener et al. 2012).
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